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B.P. JEEVAN REDDY, J. – This writ petition filed by an environmentalist organization
brings to light the woes of people living in the vicinity of chemical industrial plants in India.
It highlights the disregard, nay, contempt for law and lawful authorities on the part of some
among the emerging breed of entrepreneurs, taking advantage, as they do, of the country’s
need for industrialization and export earnings. Pursuit of profit has absolutely drained them of
any feeling for fellow human beings – for that matter, for anything else. And the law seems to
have been helpless. Systemic defects? It is such instances which have led many people in this
country to believe that disregard of law pays and that the consequences of such disregard will
never be visited upon them – particularly, if they are men with means. Strong words indeed –
but nothing less would reflect the deep sense of hurt, the hearing of this case has instilled in
us. The facts of the case will bear out these opening remarks.
- Bichhri is a small village in Udaipur District of Rajasthan. To its north is a major
industrial establishment, Hindustan Zinc Limited, a public-sector concern. That did not affect
Bichhri. Its woes began somewhere in 1987 when the fourth respondent herein, Hindustan
Agro Chemicals Limited started producing certain chemicals like Oleum (said to be the
concentrated form of sulphuric acid) and Single Super Phosphate. The real calamity occurred
when a sister concern, Silver Chemicals (Respondent 5), commenced production of ‘H’ acid
in a plant located within the same complex. ‘H’ acid was meant for export exclusively. Its
manufacture gives rise to enormous quantities of highly toxic effluents — in particular, ironbased and gypsum-based sludge – which if not properly treated, pose grave threat to Mother
Earth. It poisons the earth, the water and everything that comes in contact with it. Jyoti
Chemicals (Respondent 8) is another unit established to produce ‘H’ acid, besides some other
chemicals. Respondents 6 and 7 were established to produce fertilizers and a few other
products. - All the units/factories of Respondents 4 to 8 are situated in the same complex and are
controlled by the same group of individuals. All the units are what may be called “chemical
industries”. The complex is located within the limits of Bichhri village. - Because of the pernicious wastes emerging from the production of ‘H’ acid, its
manufacture is stated to have been banned in the western countries. But the need of ‘H’ acid
continues in the West. That need is catered to by the industries like the Silver Chemicals and
Jyoti Chemicals in this part of the world. (A few other units producing ‘H’ acid have been
established in Gujarat, as would be evident from the decision of the Gujarat High Court in
Pravinbhai Jashbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat [(1995) 2 Guj LR 1210], a decision rendered
by one of us, B.N. Kirpal, J. as the Chief Justice of that Court.) Silver Chemicals is stated to
have produced 375 MT of ‘H’ acid. The quantity of ‘H’ acid produced by Jyoti Chemicals is
not known. It says that it produced only 20 MT, as trial production, and no more. Whatever
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quantity these two units may have produced, it has given birth to about 2400-2500 MT of
highly toxic sludge (iron-based sludge and gypsum-based sludge) besides other pollutants.
Since the toxic untreated waste waters were allowed to flow out freely and because the
untreated toxic sludge was thrown in the open in and around the complex, the toxic
substances have percolated deep into the bowels of the earth polluting the aquifers and the
subterranean supply of water. The water in the wells and the streams has turned dark and dirty
rendering it unfit for human consumption. It has become unfit for cattle to drink and for
irrigating the land. The soil has become polluted rendering it unfit for cultivation, the
mainstay of the villagers. The resulting misery to the villagers needs no emphasis. It spread
disease, death and disaster in the village and the surrounding areas. This sudden degradation
of earth and water had an echo in Parliament too. A Hon’ble Minister said, action was being
taken, but nothing meaningful was done on the spot. The villagers then rose in virtual revolt
leading to the imposition of Section 144 CrPC by the District Magistrate in the area and the
closure of Silver Chemicals in January 1989. It is averred by the respondents that both the
units, Silver Chemicals and Jyoti Chemicals have stopped manufacturing ‘H’ acid since
January 1989 and are closed. We may assume it to be so. Yet the consequences of their action
remain – the sludge, the long-lasting damage to earth, to underground water, to human beings,
to cattle and the village economy. It is with these consequences that we are to contend with in
this writ petition. - The present social action litigation was initiated in August 1989 complaining precisely
of the above situation and requesting for appropriate remedial action. To the writ petition, the
petitioner enclosed a number of photographs illustrating the enormous damage done to water,
cattle, plants and to the area in general. A good amount of technical data and other material
was also produced supporting the averments in the writ petition. - The Govt. of Rajasthan filed its counter-affidavit on 20-1-1990. It made a curious
statement in para 3 to the following effect:
(T)hat the State Government is now aware of the pollution of underground water
being caused by liquid effluents from the firms arrayed as Respondents 4 to 8 in the
writ petition. Therefore, the State Government has initiated action through the
Pollution Control Board to check further spread of pollution.
The State Government stated that the water in certain wells in Bichhri village and some
other surrounding villages has become unfit for drinking by human beings and cattle, though
in some other wells, the water remains unaffected. - The first considered order made, after hearing the parties, by this Court is of 11-12-
- Under this order, the court requested the National Environmental Engineering Research
Institute (NEERI) to study the situation in and around Bichhri village and submit their report
“as to the choice and scale of the available remedial alternatives”. NEERI was requested to
suggest both short-term and long-term measures required to combat the hazard already
caused. Directions were also made for supply of drinking water to affected villages by the
State of Rajasthan. The RPCB was directed to make available to the court the Report it had
prepared concerning the situation in Bichhri village.
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Relevant statutory provisions - Article 48-A is one of the Directive Principles of State Policy. It says that the State
shall endeavour to protect and improve the environment and to safeguard the forests and
wildlife of the country. Article 51-A sets out the fundamental duties of citizens. One of them
is “(g) to protect and improve the natural environment including forests, lakes, rivers and wild
life, and to have compassion for living creatures…..” - The problem of increasing pollution of rivers and streams in the country – says the
Statement of Objects and Reasons appended to the Bill which became the Water (Prevention
and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 – attracted the attention of the State legislatures and
Parliament. They realised the urgency of ensuring that domestic and industrial effluents are
not allowed to be discharged into water courses without adequate treatment and that pollution
of rivers and streams was causing damage to the country’s economy. A committee was set up
in 1962 to draw a draft enactment for prevention of water pollution. The issue was also
considered by the Central Council of Local Self-Government in September 1963. The Council
suggested the desirability of having a single enactment for the purpose. A Draft Bill was
prepared and sent to various States. Several expert committees also made their
recommendations meanwhile. Since an enactment on the subject was relatable to Entry 17
read with Entry 6 of List II in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution – and, therefore,
within the exclusive domain of the States – the State Legislatures of Gujarat, Kerala, Haryana
and Mysore passed resolutions as contemplated by Article 252 of the Constitution enabling
Parliament to make a law on the subject. On that basis, Parliament enacted the Water
(Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974. (The State of Rajasthan too passed the
requisite resolution.) Section 24(1) of the Water Act provides that: - (1) Subject to the provisions of this section,-
(a) no person shall knowingly cause or permit any poisonous, noxious or polluting
matter determined in accordance with such standards as may be laid down by the State
Board to enter (whether directly or indirectly) into any stream or well….
Section 25(1), before it was amended by Act 53 of 1988, provided that: - (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, no person shall, without the previous
consent of the State Board, bring into use any new or altered outlet for the discharge of
sewage or trade effluent into a stream or well or begin to make any new discharge of
sewage or trade effluent into a stream or well.
As amended by Act 53 of 1988, Section 25 now reads: - (1) Subject to the provisions of this section, no person shall, without the previous
consent of the State Board, –
(a) establish or take any steps to establish any industry, operation or process, or any
treatment and disposal system or an extension or addition thereto, which is likely to
discharge sewage or trade effluent into a stream or well or sewer or on land (such
discharge being hereafter in this section referred to as ‘discharge of sewage’); or
(b) bring into use any new or altered outlets for the discharge of sewage; or
(c) begin to make any new discharge of sewage….
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It is stated that the Rajasthan Assembly passed resolution under Article 252 of the
Constitution adopting the said Amendment Act vide Gazette Notification dated 9-5-1990.
Section 33 empowers the Pollution Control Board to apply to the court, not inferior to that of
a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the First Class, to restrain any person
causing pollution if the said pollution is likely to prejudicially affect water in a stream or a
well. Section 33-A, which has been introduced by Amendment Act 53 of 1988, empowers the
Board to order the closure of any industry and to stop the electricity, water and any other
service to such industry if it finds such a direction necessary for effective implementation of
the provisions of the Act. Prior to the said Amendment Act, the Pollution Control Board had
no such power and the course open to it was to make a recommendation to the Government to
pass appropriate orders including closure. - The Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 contains similar provisions.
- In the year 1986, Parliament enacted a comprehensive legislation, Environment
(Protection) Act. The Act defines ‘environment’ to include “water, air and land and the
interrelationship which exists among and between water, air and land, and human beings,
other living creatures, plants, micro-organism and property”. The preamble to the Act recites
that the said Act was made pursuant to the decisions taken at the United Nations Conference
on Human Environment held at Stockholm in June 1972 in which India also participated.
Section 3 empowers the Central Government “to take all such measures as it deems necessary
or expedient for the purpose of protecting and improving the quality of the environment and
preventing, controlling and abating environmental pollution”. Sub-section (2) elucidates the
several powers inhering in the Central Government in the matter of protection and promotion
of environment. Section 5 empowers the Central Government to issue appropriate directions
to any person, officer or authority to further the objects of the enactment. Section 6 confers
rule-making power upon the Central Government in respect of matters referred to in Section - Section 7 says that “no person carrying on any industry, operation or process shall
discharge or emit or permit to be discharged or emitted any environmental pollutant in excess
of such standards as may be prescribed”. - The Central Government has made the Hazardous Wastes (Management and
Handling) Rules, 1989 in exercise of the power conferred upon it by Section 6 of the
Environment (Protection) Act prescribing the manner in which the hazardous wastes shall be
collected, treated, stored and disposed of.
Consideration of the submissions - Taking up the objections urged by Shri Bhat first, we find it difficult to agree with
them. This writ petition is not really for issuance of appropriate writ, order or directions
against the respondents but is directed against the Union of India, Government of Rajasthan
and RPCB to compel them to perform their statutory duties enjoined by the Acts
aforementioned on the ground that their failure to carry out their statutory duties is seriously
undermining the right to life (of the residents of Bichhri and the affected area) guaranteed by
Article 21 of the Constitution. If this Court finds that the said authorities have not taken the
action required of them by law and that their inaction is jeopardising the right to life of the
citizens of this country or of any section thereof, it is the duty of this Court to intervene. If it
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is found that the respondents are flouting the provisions of law and the directions and orders
issued by the lawful authorities, this Court can certainly make appropriate directions to ensure
compliance with law and lawful directions made thereunder. This is a social action litigation
on behalf of the villagers of Bichhri whose right to life, as elucidated by this Court in several
decisions, is invaded and seriously infringed by the respondents as is established by the
various reports of the experts called for, and filed before, this Court. If an industry is
established without obtaining the requisite permission and clearances and if the industry is
continued to be run in blatant disregard of law to the detriment of life and liberty of the
citizens living in the vicinity, can it be suggested with any modicum of reasonableness that
this Court has no power to intervene and protect the fundamental right to life and liberty of
the citizens of this country. The answer, in our opinion, is self-evident. We are also not
convinced of the plea of Shri Bhat that RPCB has been adopting a hostile attitude towards his
clients throughout and, therefore, its contentions or the reports prepared by its officers should
not be relied upon. If the respondents establish and operate their plants contrary to law,
flouting all safety norms provided by law, the RPCB was bound to act. On that account, it
cannot be said to be acting out of animus or adopting a hostile attitude. Repeated and
persistent violations call for repeated orders. That is no proof of hostility. Moreover, the
reports of RPCB officials are fully corroborated and affirmed by the reports of the Central
team of experts and of NEERI. We are also not prepared to agree with Shri Bhat that since the
report of NEERI was prepared at the instance of RPCB, it is suspect. This criticism is not only
unfair but is also uncharitable to the officials of NEERI who have no reason to be inimical to
the respondents. If, however, the actions of the respondents invite the concern of the experts
and if they depict the correct situation in their reports, they cannot be accused of any bias.
Indeed, it is this Court that asked NEERI to suggest remedial measures and it is in compliance
with those orders that NEERI submitted its interim report and also the final report. Similarly,
the objection of Shri Bhat that the reports submitted by the NEERI, by the Central team
(experts from the Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India) and RPCB
cannot be acted upon is equally unacceptable. These reports were called by this Court and
several orders passed on the basis of those reports. It was never suggested on behalf of
Respondents 4 to 8 that unless they are permitted to cross-examine the experts or the persons
who made those reports, their reports cannot be acted upon. This objection, urged at this late
stage of proceedings – after a lapse of several years – is wholly unacceptable. The persons who
made the said reports are all experts in their field and under no obligation either to the RPCB
or for that matter to any other person or industry. It is in view of their independence and
competence that their reports were relied upon and made the basis of passing orders by this
Court from time to time. - So far as the responsibility of the respondents for causing the pollution in the wells,
soil and the aquifers is concerned, it is clearly established by the analysis report referred to in
the report of the Central experts’ team dated 1-11-1993 (p. 1026 of Vol. II). Indeed, number
of orders passed by this Court, referred to hereinbefore, are premised upon the finding that the
respondents are responsible for the said pollution. It is only because of the said reason that
they were asked to defray the cost of removal and storage of sludge. It is precisely for this
reason that, at one stage, the respondents had also undertaken the de-watering of polluted
wells. Disclaiming the responsibility for the pollution in and around Bichhri village, at this
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stage of proceedings, is clearly an afterthought. We accordingly hold and affirm that the
respondents alone are responsible for all the damage to the soil, to the underground water and
to Village Bichhri in general, damage which is eloquently portrayed in the several reports of
the experts mentioned hereinabove. NEERI has worked out the cost for repairing the damage
at more than Rupees forty crores. Now, the question is whether and to what extent can the
respondents be made responsible for defraying the cost of remedial measures in these
proceedings under Article 32. Before we advert to this question, it may perhaps be appropriate
to clarify that so far as removal of remaining sludge and/or the stoppage of discharge of
further toxic wastes are concerned, it is the absolute responsibility of the respondents to store
the sludge in a proper manner (in the same manner in which 720 MT of sludge has already
been stored) and to stop the discharge of any other or further toxic wastes from its plants
including Sulphuric Acid Plant and to ensure that the wastes discharged do not flow into or
through the sludge. Now, turning to the question of liability, it would be appropriate to refer
to a few decisions on the subject. - In Oleum Gas Leak case [AIR 1987 SC 1086], a Constitution Bench discussed this
question at length and held thus:
We are of the view that an enterprise which is engaged in a hazardous or inherently
dangerous industry which poses a potential threat to the health and safety of the persons
working in the factory and residing in the surrounding areas owes an absolute and nondelegable duty to the community to ensure that no harm results to anyone on account of
hazardous or inherently dangerous nature of the activity which it has undertaken. The
enterprise must be held to be under an obligation to provide that the hazardous or inherently
dangerous activity in which it is engaged must be conducted with the highest standards of
safety and if any harm results on account of such activity, the enterprise must be absolutely
liable to compensate for such harm and it should be no answer to the enterprise to say that it
had taken all reasonable care and that the harm occurred without any negligence on its part.
Since the persons harmed on account of the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity carried
on by the enterprise would not be in a position to isolate the process of operation from the
hazardous preparation of substance or any other related element that caused the harm the
enterprise must be held strictly liable for causing such harm as a part of the social cost of
carrying on the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity. If the enterprise is permitted to
carry on an hazardous or inherently dangerous activity for its profit, the law must presume
that such permission is conditional on the enterprise absorbing the cost of any accident arising
on account of such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity as an appropriate item of its
overheads. Such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity for private profit can be tolerated
only on condition that the enterprise engaged in such hazardous or inherently dangerous
activity indemnifies all those who suffer on account of the carrying on of such hazardous or
inherently dangerous activity regardless of whether it is carried on carefully or not. …We
would therefore hold that where an enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or inherently
dangerous activity and harm results to anyone on account of an accident in the operation of
such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity resulting, for example, in escape of toxic gas
the enterprise is strictly and absolutely liable to compensate all those who are affected by the
accident and such liability is not subject to any of the exceptions which operate vis-à-vis the
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tortious principle of strict liability under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher [(1868) LR 3 HL
330].
We would also like to point out that the measure of compensation in the kind of cases
referred to in the preceding paragraph must be correlated to the magnitude and capacity of the
enterprise because such compensation must have a deterrent effect. The larger and more
prosperous the enterprise, the greater must be the amount of compensation payable by it for
the harm caused on account of an accident in the carrying on of the hazardous or inherently
dangerous activity by the enterprise. - Shri Bhat, however, points out that in the said decision, the question whether the
industry concerned therein was a ‘State’ within the meaning of Article 12 and, therefore,
subject to the discipline of Part III of the Constitution including Article 21 was left open and
that no compensation as such was awarded by this Court to the affected persons. He relies
upon the observations in the concurring opinion of Ranganath Misra, C.J., in Union Carbide
Corpn. [AIR 1992 SC 248]. The learned Chief Justice referred in the first instance, to the
propositions enunciated in Oleum Gas Leak case, and then made the following observations
in paras 14 and 15: - In M.C. Mehta case, no compensation was awarded as this Court could not
reach the conclusion that Shriram (the delinquent company) came within the
meaning of ‘State’ in Article 12 so as to be liable to the discipline of Article 21 and
to be subjected to a proceeding under Article 32 of the Constitution. Thus what was
said was essentially obiter. - The extracted part of the observations from M.C. Mehta case perhaps is a
good guideline for working out compensation in the cases to which the ratio is
intended to apply. The statement of the law ex facie makes a departure from the
accepted legal position in Rylands v. Fletcher. We have not been shown any
binding precedent from the American Supreme Court where the ratio of M.C.
Mehta decision, has in terms been applied. In fact Bhagwati, C.J. clearly indicates
in the judgment that his view is a departure from the law applicable to western
countries. - The majority judgment delivered by M.N. Venkatachaliah, J. (on behalf of himself
and two other learned Judges) has not expressed any opinion on this issue. We on our part
find it difficult to say, with great respect to the learned Chief Justice, that the law declared in
Oleum Gas Leak case, is obiter. It does not appear to be unnecessary for the purposes of that
case. Having declared the law, the Constitution Bench directed the parties and other
organisations to institute actions on the basis of the law so declared. Be that as it may, we are
of the considered opinion that even if it is assumed (for the sake of argument) that this Court
cannot award damages against the respondents in these proceedings that does not mean that
the Court cannot direct the Central Government to determine and recover the cost of remedial
measures from the respondents. Section 3 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986
expressly empowers the Central Government (or its delegate, as the case may be) to “take all
such measures as it deems necessary or expedient for the purpose of protecting and
improving the quality of environment…”. Section 5 clothes the Central Government (or its
delegate) with the power to issue directions for achieving the objects of the Act. Read with
41
the wide definition of ‘environment’ in Section 2(a), Sections 3 and 5 clothe the Central
Government with all such powers as are “necessary or expedient for the purpose of protecting
and improving the quality of the environment”. The Central Government is empowered to
take all measures and issue all such directions as are called for the above purpose. In the
present case, the said powers will include giving directions for the removal of sludge, for
undertaking remedial measures and also the power to impose the cost of remedial measures
on the offending industry and utilise the amount so recovered for carrying out remedial
measures. This Court can certainly give directions to the Central Government/its delegate to
take all such measures, if in a given case this Court finds that such directions are warranted.
We find that similar directions have been made in a recent decision of this Court in Indian
Council for Enviro-Legal Action, [1995 (5) SCALE 578]. That was also a writ petition filed
under Article 32 of the Constitution. Following is the direction:
It appears that the Pollution Control Board had identified as many as 22
industries responsible for the pollution caused by discharge of their effluents into
Nakkavagu. They were responsible to compensate to farmers. It was the duty of the
State Government to ensure that this amount was recovered from the industries and
paid to the farmers.
It is, therefore, idle to contend that this Court cannot make appropriate directions for the
purpose of ensuring remedial action. It is more a matter of form. - Shri K.N. Bhat submitted that the rule of absolute liability is not accepted in England
or other Commonwealth countries and that the rule evolved by the House of Lords in Rylands
v. Fletcher, is the correct rule to be applied in such matters. Firstly, in view of the binding
decision of this Court in Oleum Gas Leak case, this contention is untenable, for the said
decision expressly refers to the rule in Rylands but refuses to apply it saying that it is not
suited to the conditions in India. Even so, for the sake of completeness, we may discuss the
rule in Rylands and indicate why that rule is inappropriate and unacceptable in this country.
The rule was first stated by Blackburn, J. (Court of Exchequer Chamber) in the following
words:
We think that the true rule of law is that the person who, for his own purposes,
brings on his land and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it
escapes, must keep it in at his peril, and, if he does not do so, he is prima facie
answerable for all the damage which is the natural consequence of its escape. He can
excuse himself by showing that the escape was owing to the plaintiff’s default, or
perhaps, that the escape was the consequence of vis major, or the act of God; … and it
seems but reasonable and just that the neighbour who has brought something on his
own property which was not naturally there, harmless to others so long as it is
confined to his own property, but which he knows will be mischievous if it gets on
his neighbour’s, should be obliged to make good the damage which ensues if he does
not succeed in confining it to his own property. - The House of Lords, however, added a rider to the above statement, viz., that the user
by the defendant should be a “non-natural” user to attract the rule. In other words, if the user
by the defendant is a natural user of the land, he would not be liable for damages. Thus, the
42
twin tests – apart from the proof of damage to the plaintiff by the act/negligence of the
defendants – which must be satisfied to attract this rule are ‘foreseeability’ and ‘non-natural’
user of the land. - The rule in Rylands has been approved by the House of Lords in the recent decision
in Cambridge Water Co. Ltd. v. Eastern Counties Leather, plc,[(1994) (2) W.L.R. 53]. The
plaintiff, Cambridge Water Company, was a statutory corporation engaged in providing
public water supply within a certain area including the city of Cambridge. It was lifting water
from a bore well situated at some distance from Sawstyn. The defendant-Company Eastern
Leather, was having a tannery in Sawstyn. Tanning necessarily involves degreasing of pelts.
For that purpose, the defendant was using an organo chlorine called PCE. PCE was stored in a
tank in the premises of the defendant. The plaintiff’s case was that on account of the PCE
percolating into the ground, the water in its well became contaminated and unfit for human
consumption and that on that account it was obliged to find an alternative source at a
substantial cost. It sued the defendant for the resulting damages. The plaintiff based his claim
on three alternative grounds, viz., negligence, nuisance and the rule in Rylands. The trial
Judge (High Court) dismissed the action in negligence and nuisance holding that the
defendant could not have reasonably foreseen that such damage could occur to the plaintiff.
So far as the rule in Rylands was concerned, the trial Judge held that the user by the defendant
was not a non-natural user and hence, it was not liable for damages. On appeal, the Court of
Appeal declined to decide the matter on the basis of the rule in Rylands. It relied strongly
upon the ratio in Ballard v. Tomlinson [(1885) 29 Ch. D. 1115], holding that no person
having a right to use a common source is entitled to contaminate that source so as to prevent
his neighbour from having a full value of his right of appropriation. The Court of Appeal also
opined that the defendant’s use of the land was not a natural use. On appeal by the defendant,
the House of Lords allowed the appeal holding that foreseeability of the harm of the relevant
type by the defendant was a pre-requisite to the right to recover damages both under the heads
of nuisance and also under the rule in Rylands and since that was not established by the
plaintiff, it has to fail. The House of Lords, no doubt, held that the defendant’s use of the land
was a non-natural use but dismissed the suit, as stated above, on the ground that the plaintiff
has failed to establish that pollution of their water supply by the solvent used by the defendant
in his premises was in the circumstances of the case foreseeable by the defendant. - The Australian High Court has, however, expressed its disinclination to treat the rule
in Rylands as an independent head for claiming damages or as a rule rooted in the law
governing the law of nuisance in Burnie Port Authority v. General Jones Pty Ltd. [(1994) 68
Aus. L J 331], The respondent, General Jones Limited, had stored frozen vegetables in three
cold storage rooms in the building owned by the appellant, Burnie Port Authority (Authority).
The remaining building remained under the occupation of the Authority. The Authority
wanted to extend the building. The extension work was partly done by the Authority itself and
partly by an independent contractor (Wildridge and Sinclair Pty. Ltd.). For doing its work, the
contractor used a certain insulating material called EPS, a highly inflammable substance. On
account of negligent handling of EPS, there was a fire which inter alia damaged the rooms in
which General Jones had stored its vegetables. On an action by General Jones, the Australian
High Court held by a majority that the rule in Rylands having attracted many difficulties,
43
uncertainties, qualifications and exceptions, should now be seen, for the purposes of
Australian Common Law, as absorbed by the principles of ordinary negligence. The Court
held further that under the rules governing negligence, if a person in control of a premises,
introduces a dangerous substance to carry on a dangerous activity, or allows another to do one
of those things, owes a duty of reasonable care to avoid a reasonably foreseeable risk of injury
or damage to the person or property of another. In a case where a person or the property of
that other is lawfully in a place outside the premises, the duty of care varies in degree
according to the magnitude of the risk involved and extends to ensuring that such care is
taken. Applying the said principle, the court held that the authority allowed the independent
contractor to introduce or retain a dangerous substance or to engage in a dangerous activity in
its premises which substance and activity caused a fire that destroyed the goods of General
Jones. The evidence, the court held, established that the independent contractor’s work was a
dangerous activity in that it involved real and foreseeable risk of a serious conflagration
unless special precautions were taken. In the circumstances, it was held that the authority
owed a non-delegable duty of care to General Jones to ensure that its contractor took
reasonable steps to prevent the occurrence of a fire and the breach of that duty attracted
liability pursuant to the ordinary principles of negligence for the damage sustained by the
respondent. - On a consideration of the two lines of thought (one adopted by the English courts and
the other by the Australian High Court), we are of the opinion that any principle evolved in
this behalf should be simple, practical and suited to the conditions obtaining in this country.
We are convinced that the law stated by this Court in Oleum Gas Leak case, is by far the
more appropriate one – apart from the fact that it is binding upon us. (We have disagreed with
the view that the law stated in the said decision is obiter.) According to this rule, once the
activity carried on is hazardous or inherently dangerous, the person carrying on such activity
is liable to make good the loss caused to any other person by his activity irrespective of the
fact whether he took reasonable care while carrying on his activity. The rule is premised upon
the very nature of the activity carried on. In the words of the Constitution Bench, such an
activity:
(C)an be tolerated only on condition that the enterprise engaged in such hazardous or
inherently dangerous activity indemnifies all those who suffer on account of the carrying on
of such hazardous or inherently dangerous activity regardless of whether it is carried on
carefully or not.
The Constitution Bench has also assigned the reason for stating the law in the said terms.
It is that the enterprise (carrying on the hazardous or inherently dangerous activity) alone has
the resource to discover and guard against hazards or dangers – and not the person affected
and the practical difficulty (on the part of the affected person) in establishing the absence of
reasonable care or that the damage to him was foreseeable by the enterprise. - Once the law in Oleum Gas Leak case, is held to be the law applicable, it follows, in
the light of our findings recorded hereinbefore, that Respondents 4 to 8 are absolutely liable to
compensate for the harm caused by them to the villagers in the affected area, to the soil and to
the underground water and hence, they are bound to take all necessary measures to remove
the sludge and other pollutants lying in the affected area (by affected area, we mean the area
44
of about 350 ha indicated in the sketch at p. 178 of NEERI report) and also to defray the cost
of the remedial measures required to restore the soil and the underground water sources.
Sections 3 and 4 of Environment (Protection) Act confers upon the Central Government the
power to give directions of the above nature and to the above effect. Levy of costs required
for carrying out remedial measures is implicit in Sections 3 and 4 which are couched in very
wide and expansive language. Appropriate directions can be given by this Court to the Central
Government to invoke and exercise those powers with such modulations as are called for in
the facts and circumstances of this case. - The question of liability of the respondents to defray the costs of remedial measures
can also be looked into from another angle, which has now come to be accepted universally as
a sound principle, viz., the “Polluter Pays” principle.
The Polluter Pays principle demands that the financial costs of preventing or remedying
damage caused by pollution should lie with the undertakings which cause the pollution, or
produce the goods which cause the pollution. Under the principle it is not the role of
Government to meet the costs involved in either prevention of such damage, or in carrying out
remedial action, because the effect of this would be to shift the financial burden of the
pollution incident to the taxpayer. The ‘Polluter Pays’ principle was promoted by the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) during the 1970s when
there was great public interest in environmental issues. During this time there were demands
on Government and other institutions to introduce policies and mechanisms for the protection
of the environment and the public from the threats posed by pollution in a modern
industrialised society. Since then there has been considerable discussion of the nature of the
Polluter Pays principle, but the precise scope of the principle and its implications for those
involved in past, or potentially polluting activities have never been satisfactorily agreed.
Despite the difficulties inherent in defining the principle, the European Community
accepted it as a fundamental part of its strategy on environmental matters, and it has been one
of the underlying principles of the four Community Action Programmes on the Environment.
The current Fourth Action Programme [(1987) OJC 328/1] makes it clear that ‘the cost of
preventing and eliminating nuisances must in principle be borne by the polluter’, and the
Polluter Pays principle has now been incorporated into the European Community Treaty as
part of the new articles on the environment which were introduced by the Single European
Act of 1986. Article 130-R(2) of the Treaty states that environmental considerations are to
play a part in all the policies of the community, and that action is to be based on three
principles: the need for preventive action; the need for environmental damage to be rectified
at source; and that the polluter should pay.
Thus, according to this principle, the responsibility for repairing the damage is that of the
offending industry. Sections 3 and 5 empower the Central Government to give directions and
take measures for giving effect to this principle. In all the circumstances of the case, we think
it appropriate that the task of determining the amount required for carrying out the remedial
measures, its recovery/realisation and the task of undertaking the remedial measures is placed
upon the Central Government in the light of the provisions of the Environment (Protection)
Act, 1986. It is, of course, open to the Central Government to take the help and assistance of
State Government, RPCB or such other agency or authority, as they think fit.
45
Directions - Accordingly, the following directions are made:
- The Central Government shall determine the amount required for carrying out
the remedial measures including the removal of sludge lying in and around the
complex of Respondents 4 to 8, in the area affected in Village Bichhri and other
adjacent villages, on account of the production of ‘H’ acid and the discharges from
the Sulphuric Acid Plant of Respondents 4 to 8. Chapters VI and VII in NEERI
report (submitted in 1994) shall be deemed to be the show-cause notice issued by the
Central Government proposing the determination of the said amount. Within six
weeks from this day, Respondents 4 to 8 shall submit their explanation, along with
such material as they think appropriate in support of their case, to the Secretary,
Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India, (MEF). The Secretary
shall thereupon determine the amount in consultation with the experts of his Ministry
within six weeks of the submission of the explanation by the said respondents. The
orders passed by the Secretary, (MEF) shall be communicated to Respondents 4 to 8
- and all concerned – and shall also be placed before this Court. Subject to the orders,
if any, passed by this Court, the said amount shall represent the amount which
Respondents 4 to 8 are liable to pay to improve and restore the environment in the
area. For the purpose of these proceedings, the Secretary, (MEF) and Respondents 4
to 8 shall proceed on the assumption that the affected area is 350 ha, as indicated in
the sketch at p. 178 of NEERI report. In case of failure of the said respondents to
pay the said amount, the same shall be recovered by the Central Government in
accordance with law. The factories, plant, machinery and all other immovable assets
of Respondents 4 to 8 are attached herewith. The amount so determined and
recovered shall be utilised by the MEF for carrying out all necessary remedial
measures to restore the soil, water sources and the environment in general of the
affected area to its former state.
- On account of their continuous, persistent and insolent violations of law, their
attempts to conceal the sludge, their discharge of toxic effluents from the Sulphuric
Acid Plant which was allowed to flow through the sludge, and their nonimplementation of the orders of this Court – all of which are fully borne out by the
Expert Committee’s reports and the findings recorded hereinabove – Respondents 4
to 8 have earned the dubious distinction of being characterised as “rogue industries”.
They have inflicted untold misery upon the poor, unsuspecting villagers, de-spoiling
their land, their water sources and their entire environment – all in pursuance of their
private profit. They have forfeited all claims for any consideration by this Court.
Accordingly, we herewith order the closure of all the plants and factories of
Respondents 4 to 8 located in Bichhri village. The RPCB is directed to seal all the
factories/units/plants of the said respondents forthwith. So far as the Sulphuric Acid
Plant is concerned, it will be closed at the end of one week from today, within which
period Respondent 4 shall wind down its operations so as to avoid risk of any
untoward consequences, as asserted by Respondent 4 in Writ Petition (C) No. 76 of - It is the responsibility of Respondent 4 to take necessary steps in this behalf.
46
The RPCB shall seal this unit too at the end of one week from today. The reopening
of these plants shall depend upon their compliance with the directions made and
obtaining of all requisite permissions and consents from the relevant authorities.
Respondents 4 to 8 can apply for directions in this behalf after such compliance. - So far as the claim for damages for the loss suffered by the villagers in the
affected area is concerned, it is open to them or any organisation on their behalf to
institute suits in the appropriate civil court. If they file the suit or suits in forma
pauperis, the State of Rajasthan shall not oppose their applications for leave to sue in
forma pauperis. - The Central Government shall consider whether it would not be appropriate,
in the light of the experience gained, that chemical industries are treated as a
category apart. Since the chemical industries are the main culprits in the matter of
polluting the environment, there is every need for scrutinising their establishment
and functioning more rigorously. No distinction should be made in this behalf as
between a large-scale industry and a small-scale industry or for that matter between a
large-scale industry and a medium-scale industry. All chemical industries, whether
big or small, should be allowed to be established only after taking into consideration
all the environmental aspects and their functioning should be monitored closely to
ensure that they do not pollute the environment around them. It appears that most of
these industries are water-intensive industries. If so, the advisability of allowing the
establishment of these industries in arid areas may also require examination. Even
the existing chemical industries may be subjected to such a study and if it is found on
such scrutiny that it is necessary to take any steps in the interests of environment,
appropriate directions in that behalf may be issued under Sections 3 and 5 of the
Environment Act. The Central Government shall ensure that the directions given by
it are implemented forthwith. - The Central Government and the RPCB shall file quarterly reports before this
Court with respect to the progress in the implementation of Directions 1 to 4
aforesaid. - The suggestion for establishment of environment courts is a commendable
one. The experience shows that the prosecutions launched in ordinary criminal courts
under the provisions of the Water Act, Air Act and Environment Act never reach
their conclusion either because of the workload in those courts or because there is no
proper appreciation of the significance of the environment matters on the part of
those in charge of conducting of those cases. Moreover, any orders passed by the
authorities under Water and Air Acts and the Environment Act are immediately
questioned by the industries in courts. Those proceedings take years and years to
reach conclusion. Very often, interim orders are granted meanwhile which
effectively disable the authorities from ensuring the implementation of their orders.
All this points to the need for creating environment courts which alone should be
empowered to deal with all matters, civil and criminal, relating to environment.
These courts should be manned by legally trained persons/judicial officers and
47
should be allowed to adopt summary procedures. This issue, no doubt, requires to be
studied and examined in depth from all angles before taking any action. - The Central Government may also consider the advisability of strengthening
the environment protection machinery both at the Centre and the States and provide
them more teeth. The heads of several units and agencies should be made personally
accountable for any lapses and/or negligence on the part of their units and agencies.
The idea of an environmental audit by specialist bodies created on a permanent basis
with power to inspect, check and take necessary action not only against erring
industries but also against erring officers may be considered. The idea of an
environmental audit conducted periodically and certified annually, by specialists in
the field, duly recognised, can also be considered. The ultimate idea is to integrate
and balance the concern for environment with the need for industrialisation and
technological progress. - Respondents 4 to 8 shall pay a sum of Rupees fifty thousand by way of costs to the
petitioner which had to fight this litigation over a period of over six years with its own means.
Voluntary bodies, like the petitioner, deserve encouragement wherever their actions are found
to be in furtherance of public interest. The said sum shall be deposited in this Court within
two weeks from today. It shall be paid over to the petitioner.
48
Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India, (2011) 12
SCC 768
DALVEER BHANDARI, J. 1. This is a very unusual and extraordinary litigation where
even after fifteen years of the final judgment of this court (date of judgment 13th February,
1996) the litigation has been deliberately kept alive by filing one interlocutory application or
the other in order to avoid compliance of the judgment. The said judgment of this Court has
not been permitted to acquire finality till date. This is a classic example how by abuse of the
process of law even the final judgment of the apex court can be circumvented for more than a
decade and a half. This is indeed a very serious matter concerning the sanctity and credibility
of the judicial system in general and of the apex court in particular.
- The basic facts of this case are taken from the judgment delivered in the Writ Petition
No.967 of 1989. In the beginning of the judgment of this court delivered on February 13,
1996, it is observed as under:
It highlights the disregard, nay, contempt for law and lawful authorities on the part of
some among the emerging breed of entrepreneurs, taking advantage, as they do, of the
country’s need for industrialisation and export earnings. Pursuit of profit has absolutely
drained them of any feeling for fellow human beings – for that matter, for anything else. And
the law seems to have been helpless. Systemic defects? It is such instances which have led
many people in this country to believe that disregard of law pays and that the consequences of
such disregard will never be visited upon them -particularly, if they are men with means.
Strong words indeed – but nothing less would reflect the deep sense of hurt, the hearing of this
case has instilled in us. - It seems that the court was prophetic when it made observation that at times men with
means are successful in avoiding compliance of the orders of this court. This case is a classic
illustration where even after decade and a half of the pronouncement of the judgment by this
court based on the principle of `polluter pays’, till date the polluters (concerned industries in
this case) have taken no steps to ecologically restore the entire village and its surrounding
areas or complied with the directions of this court at all. The orders of this court were not
implemented by keeping the litigation alive by filing interlocutory and interim applications
even after dismissal of the writ petition, the review petition and the curative petition by this
court. - The other aspect which has been dealt with in great details is to neutralize any unjust
enrichment and undeserved gain made by the litigants. While adjudicating, the courts must
keep the following principles in view. - It is the bounden duty and obligation of the court to neutralize any unjust enrichment
and undeserved gain made by any party by invoking the jurisdiction of the court. - When a party applies and gets a stay or injunction from the court, it is always at the risk
and responsibility of the party applying. An order of stay cannot be presumed to be
conferment of additional right upon the litigating party.
49 - Unscrupulous litigants be prevented from taking undue advantage by invoking
jurisdiction of the Court. - A person in wrongful possession should not only be removed from that place as early
as possible but be compelled to pay for wrongful use of that premises fine, penalty and costs.
Any leniency would seriously affect the credibility of the judicial system. - No litigant can derive benefit from the mere pendency of a case in a court of law.
- A party cannot be allowed to take any benefit of his own wrongs.
- Litigation should not be permitted to turn into a fruitful industry so that the
unscrupulous litigants are encouraged to invoke the jurisdiction of the court. - The institution of litigation cannot be permitted to confer any advantage on a party by
delayed action of courts. - It may be pertinent to mention that even after dismissal of review petition and of the
curative petition on 18.7.2002, the applicants (respondent Nos. 4 to 8) have been repeatedly
filing one petition or the other in order to keep the litigation alive. It is indeed astonishing that
the orders of this court have not been implemented till date. The applicants have made all
possible efforts to avoid compliance of the judgment of this Court. This is a clear case of
abuse of process of the court. - The Court in its order dated 04.11.1997 while accepting the report of the MOEF
directed the applicant – M/s Hindustan Agro Chemical Ltd. to pay a sum of Rs.37.385 crores
towards the costs of remediation. The amount which ought to have been deposited way back
in 1997 has yet not been deposited by keeping the litigation alive. - We have carefully considered the facts and circumstances of this case. We have also
considered the law declared by this Court and by other countries in a number of cases. We are
clearly of the opinion that the concerned applicant-industry must deposit the amount as
directed by this Court vide order dated 4.11.1997 with compound interest. The applicantindustry has deliberately not complied with the orders of this court since 4.11.1997.
Thousands of villagers have been adversely affected because no effective remedial steps have
been taken so far. The applicant- industry has succeeded in their design in not complying with
the court’s order by keeping the litigation alive. - Both these interlocutory applications being totally devoid of any merit are
accordingly dismissed with costs.
Consequently, the applicant-industry is directed to pay Rs.37.385 crores along with
compound interest @ 12% per annum from 4.11.1997 till the amount is paid or recovered. - The applicant-industry is also directed to pay costs of litigation. Even after final
judgment of this Court, the litigation has been kept alive for almost 15 years. The respondents
have been compelled to defend this litigation for all these years. Enormous court’s time has
been wasted for all these years.
50 - On consideration of the totality of the facts and circumstances of this case, we direct
the applicant-industry to pay costs of Rs.10 lakhs in both the Interlocutory Applications. The
amount of costs would also be utilized for carrying out remedial measure in village Bichhri
and surrounding areas in Udaipur District of Rajasthan on the direction of the concerned
authorities. - In case the amount as directed by this Court and costs imposed by this Court are not
paid within two months, the same would be recovered as arrears of the land revenue. - Both these interlocutory applications are accordingly disposed of.
