Introduction | jurisprudence |
Provisions | principle of natural justice |
Case Laws | G.N. Nayak v. Goa University (2002) 2 SCC 712 : AIR 2002 SC 790 A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India AIR 1970 SC 150 : (1969) 2 SCC 262 Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana (1985) 4 SCC 417 : AIR 1987 SC 454 State of W.B. v. Shivananda Pathak (1998) 5 SCC 513 |
Conclusion | present problem |
What is Principle of Natural Justice?
The principle of natural justice is a cornerstone of fair decision-making in legal and administrative processes. Rooted in the idea of fairness, equity, and equality, it ensures that decisions are made without bias and after giving all concerned parties an opportunity to present their case. This principle is essential for protecting individual rights and maintaining public confidence in the legal and administrative systems.
This principle is not codified in a single statute but is derived from common law.
Rules/ Maxims of Natural Justice
- NEMO JUDEX IN CAUSA SUA: No one should be judge in his own case. This maxim asserts that a person cannot judge a matter in which they have a personal interest, whether it is pecuniary, personal, or professional.
- AUDI ALTERAM PARTEM: Hear the other side. This maxim guarantees that every individual has the right to be heard before a decision affecting them is made.
- REASONED DECISION: Speaking orders. This principle requires that decisions must be supported by clear, logical, and justifiable reasons.
Rule Against Bias (Nemo Judex in Causa Sua)
The rule against bias is a fundamental principle of natural justice, encapsulated in the maxim ‘nemo judex in causa sua’ (no one should be a judge in their own cause). As one of the twin pillars of natural justice, it is a cornerstone of fair procedure, designed to ensure impartiality in decision-making and uphold public confidence in the judicial and administrative systems. This rule seeks to prevent decisions from being tainted by personal interests or prejudices, thereby safeguarding the integrity of the adjudicative process.
Bias refers to predisposition or prejudice for or against a person, group, or issue that can influence impartial judgement. Even the likelihood or perception of bias is sufficient to disqualify a decision-maker. Bias can arise from personal , financial or institutional factors.
Types of Bias
- Pecuniary Bias (Financial Interest): This occurs when the decision-maker has a financial interest in the outcome of the case. Any financial interest, regardless of its magnitude, is deemed to be disqualifying, as it creates a direct conflict of interest and raises serious concerns about impartiality. For example, a regulator making a decision that affects a company in which they own shares, or a tribunal member deciding a case that could impact their own financial holdings. This creates a direct conflict of interest, as the decision-maker may be tempted to decide in a way that benefits them financially, compromising the integrity of the decision.
- Personal Bias: This arises when the decision-maker has a personal relational (like friendship, enmity or familial ties) with one of the parties involved. Such relationships, whether based on affection, animosity, or professional rivalry, may consciously or unconsciously influence the decision-maker’s judgment, leading to partiality. For example, a judge deciding a case involving a close family member, friend, or a known adversary. This undermines the perception of a fair hearing, as the decision-maker’s personal feelings may cloud their objectivity, potentially leading to an unfair outcome.
- Subject Matter Bias: It occurs when the decision-maker has a direct or indirect interest in the subject matter of the case. For instance, if a member of a committee deciding on environmental regulations also heads a lobbying group with strong views on those regulations, their personal views might influence their decision. The concern here is not a personal relationship with a party, but a bias towards the issue at hand.
- Departmental Bias: This arises in administrative contexts when a decision-maker is reviewing a decision made within their own department or organization. There may be a natural inclination to support the department’s initial stance or to protect its reputation. For example, if a senior official is tasked with reviewing a subordinate’s decision, they might be biased in favor of upholding that decision, even if it is flawed.
- Policy Notion Bias: Policy notion bias arises when a decision-maker has strong views on a policy issue relevant to the case at hand. While holding policy views is not inherently problematic, bias occurs if the decision-maker is unable to set aside those views and consider the specific facts of the case objectively. For instance, a member of a tribunal with strong views on immigration policy might struggle to impartially assess the merits of an individual asylum claim.
- Bias on account of obstinacy: The word Obstinacy implies unreasonable and unwavering persistence and the deciding officer would not take no for an answer. This new category of bias was discovered in a situation where a judge of the Calcutta High Court upheld his own judgment while sitting in appeal against his own judgment. Of course a direct violation of the rule that no judge can sit in appeal against his own judgment is not possible, therefore, this rule can only be violated indirectly.
Exceptions to the Rule against Bias
- Doctrine of Necessity: This is a significant exception. If the only person or authority capable of making a decision is potentially biased, they may still be allowed to do so if there is no other way to proceed. The necessity to make a decision overrides the concern for bias to prevent a standstill. This doctrine is applied cautiously and generally not for minor matters. There’s also the concept of absolute necessity, where it’s imperative for the biased person to decide.
- Statutory Exception: A statute enacted by the parliament or legislature can explicitly exclude the application of the rule against bias. Similarly, a statute might implicitly exclude it if the structure and purpose of the legislation suggest that impartiality in the traditional sense is not required or feasible for certain decisions. However, such exclusions are subject to judicial scrutiny and must not violate fundamental rights.
- Waiver: If a party aware of a potential bias does not raise an objection in a timely manner, they may be considered to have waived their right to challenge the decision on the grounds of bias later. The waiver must be informed, clear, and unequivocal.
Case Laws
G.N. Nayak v. Goa University
Facts: Following a vacancy for a Marine Science professor, initial advertisements yielded no suitable applicants. A subsequent advertisement drew applications from the appellant and Respondent No. 5, both Readers in the same department, with Respondent No. 5 holding seniority. The Selection Committee recommended the appellant, prompting Respondent No. 5 to challenge the decision under Article 226 of the Constitution. The High Court upheld the challenge, ruling that the advertised eligibility criteria were illegally altered, and the Selection Committee was both improperly constituted and biased.
Issue: Whether appellant’s selection as Professor of Marine Science in the University of Goa was vitiated by bias?
Judgement: The Court determined that “research at the university/national-level institution” encompassed pre-doctoral research, aligning with the University’s established practice and supported by the Kumar Bar Das precedent.
The Court found the Selection Committee’s composition to be compliant with Statute 15 of the Goa University Act, 1984. The discrepancy regarding Dr. Chandramohan’s presence was deemed a clerical error, substantiated by the Registrar’s affidavit. The Court distinguished between genuine bias and mere expressions of positive opinion or commendation. It concluded that Respondent 5 did not provide sufficient evidence of prejudice or personal interest to substantiate a claim of bias against Respondent 2. The Court addressed the lack of detailed grading records by referring to relevant ordinances. It held that the unanimous decision of the Selection Committee was sufficient in the absence of explicit procedural requirements. The Court adopted a pragmatic approach, prioritizing the intended application of rules and consistent practices over strict adherence to technical formalities.
The Supreme Court, after detailed examination, found the University’s criteria application consistent and dismissed bias allegations. Consequently, it upheld Dr. Nayak’s appointment, reversing the High Court’s decision.
A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India
Facts: A dispute arose regarding the selection of officers for both the ex-officio chairman of the J&K Forest Department’s selection board and the All India Forest Service. Gazetted officers challenged the former, citing the supersession of senior candidates and a violation of natural justice. The UPSC investigated the latter, where Naquishbund topped the list. Petitioners claimed board bias and argued the process was administrative, not quasi-judicial. However, the UPSC determined the board’s function was simply to select suitable candidates, dismissing the petitioners’ grievances as unfounded.
Issue: Whether principles of natural justice applied to the proceedings in the present case?
Whether there is a line between quasi-judicial and administrative actions, as well as the applicability of natural justice rules to administrative actions or not?
Judgement: The principles of natural justice, those fundamental rules of fairness and impartiality, come into play specifically in situations where a validly enacted law does not provide explicit guidance. In essence, they function as a supplementary legal framework, filling gaps and ensuring fairness in administrative and quasi-judicial processes, rather than displacing or overriding existing statutory law. It is crucial to recognize that the impact of an unjust decision made in an administrative inquiry can often be more pervasive and far-reaching than a similar decision rendered in a quasi-judicial context. This is due to the broad scope and potential consequences of administrative actions, which can affect a wider range of individuals and interests.
Therefore, it is imperative that all inquiries, particularly those conducted by administrative bodies, are carried out with the utmost good faith and complete impartiality. Decisions must be made without any semblance of bias, and they must be grounded in reason, avoiding any arbitrary or unreasonable outcomes. When a court receives a complaint alleging a violation of a principle of natural justice, a crucial task falls upon the judiciary. The court must meticulously examine the facts of the case and determine whether the alleged violation was indeed necessary to arrive at a just and equitable decision. This involves a careful balancing act, ensuring that procedural fairness is upheld while also recognizing the need for efficient and effective decision-making.
In the specific instance under consideration, the Acting Chief Conservator’s decision to appoint a successor to the original conservatory was demonstrably tainted by bias. This bias compromised the integrity of the selection process and raised serious concerns about its fairness. Crucially, the other members of the Selection Board were operating under a significant informational deficit. At the time of the selection, they were unaware that the superseded conservator had a pending appeal before the State Government. This lack of knowledge meant that they had no reason to question the Acting Chief Conservator’s judgment or suspect any underlying bias. Consequently, they reasonably relied on his assessment, unaware of the potential for injustice.
The court invalidated a selection process due to a “real possibility of bias” arising from a candidate’s presence on the Selection Board, violating natural justice principles. The court classified the Board’s power as administrative, not quasi-judicial, and ruled that natural justice applies to administrative functions as well. The decision emphasized the necessity of impartiality in all adjudicative processes, regardless of their nature. The Attorney-General’s argument that the selection was purely administrative and not quasi-judicial was noted, but the selection was still invalidated.
Ashok Kumar Yadav v. State of Haryana
Facts: The core issue in this legal challenge centers on the validity and fairness of the selection process conducted by the Haryana Public Service Commission (HPSC) for recruitment into the prestigious Haryana Civil Service (Executive) and its related Allied Services. A critical point of contention arose from the HPSC’s decision to exclude candidates who had achieved demonstrably high scores in the written examination. These candidates, despite their strong performance in the objective component of the evaluation, were subsequently omitted from the final selection list. The basis for their exclusion was their performance in the viva voce, or interview, portion of the assessment. Aggrieved by this outcome, the affected candidates sought legal recourse by filing a petition before the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court. After a thorough examination of the evidence and arguments presented, the High Court rendered a significant judgment. The Division Bench determined that the HPSC’s selection process was fundamentally flawed, exhibiting elements of bias, arbitrariness, and administrative malfeasance. Consequently, the High Court quashed the selections, effectively nullifying the HPSC’s decision.
Dissatisfied with the High Court’s ruling, or seeking a definitive resolution to the matter, the HPSC, or potentially other involved parties, have now lodged an appeal before the Supreme Court of India.
Issue: Whether the allocation of as high a percentage of marks as 33.3 percent in the case of ex-service officers and 22.2 percent in the case of other candidates, for the viva voce test render the selection process arbitrary?
Whether the High Court rightly condemn the Chairman and members of the Commission as men without integrity, caliber, or qualification, and had corrupt motives?
Judgement: The Court dismissed the High Court’s claims of HPSC member bias, emphasizing that mere suspicion, without concrete proof, is insufficient to overturn selections. It reinforced the principle that natural justice requires the absence of actual bias, and that assumptions aren’t sufficient.
While acknowledging procedural flaws, such as the excessive number of interviewees and the high weightage of the viva voce, the Court concluded these alone were not sufficient to deem the entire selection process arbitrary and invalidate past selections. The court looked at the difference between procedural errors, and errors that invalidate the process.
While acknowledging procedural flaws, such as the excessive number of interviewees and the high weightage of the viva voce, the Court concluded these alone were not sufficient to deem the entire selection process arbitrary and invalidate past selections. The court looked at the difference between procedural errors, and errors that invalidate the process.
The Court criticized the HPSC’s allocation of 33.3% marks for ex-service officer interviews and 22.2% for general candidates, deeming it excessively high compared to established norms, such as the UPSC’s 12.2%.
This critiqued the disproportionate impact of the interview.The Court referenced previous judgments to reinforce the importance of preventing even the appearance of bias and upholding the integrity of selection processes. Prior cases were used to support the courts decisions.
The Supreme Court overturned the High Court’s decision, validating the HPSC selections. While acknowledging procedural flaws—excessive interviewees and disproportionate interview weight—the Court ordered the HPSC to revise mark allocation for future selections and allow excluded candidates to retake the exam.
State of W.B. v. Shivananda Pathak
Facts: The case centers on questions of judicial impartiality and fairness in administrative procedures. Shivannanda Pathak and co-respondents challenged promotion policies within the West Bengal Subordinate Labour Service, claiming discriminatory treatment. The core legal argument focuses on whether judicial obstinacy, defined as the persistent adherence to a viewpoint despite appellate reversals, represents a form of bias that compromises judicial integrity.
Issue: whether Mr. Justice Ajit Kumar Sengupta’s involvement in both the initial and appellate stages constituted “judicial obstinacy”?
Judgement: The Supreme Court of India considered appeals against a Calcutta High Court Division Bench ruling, which had modified an earlier judgment concerning promotions within the West Bengal Subordinate Labour Service. Mr. Justice Ajit Kumar Sengupta’s initial judgment had granted retroactive promotions to Assistant Computers, but the Division Bench altered the promotion criteria and removed the retroactive aspect.
The Supreme Court’s decision focused on defining and addressing judicial bias, including the newly recognized “judicial obstinacy. The Court identified “judicial obstinacy,” the repeated insistence on a view despite reversals, as a form of bias indicative of prejudice.
The Court clarified that bias impairs a judge’s impartiality. It elaborated on various forms: pecuniary, personal, policy, and now, judicial obstinacy.
Allowing Mr. Justice Ajit Kumar Sengupta to preside over both the initial case and its appeal created an appearance of bias, undermining public trust. The Court reinforced the maxim “nemo debet esse judex in propria causa” (no one should be a judge in their own cause). It emphasized that justice must not only be done but also be seen to be done, ensuring the integrity of judicial proceedings.
The Supreme Court of India considered appeals against a Calcutta High Court Division Bench ruling, which had modified an earlier judgment concerning promotions within the West Bengal Subordinate Labour Service. Mr. Justice Ajit Kumar Sengupta’s initial judgment had granted retroactive promotions to Assistant Computers, but the Division Bench altered the promotion criteria and removed the retroactive aspect.
The Supreme Court’s decision focused on defining and addressing judicial bias, including the newly recognized “judicial obstinacy. The Court identified “judicial obstinacy,” the repeated insistence on a view despite reversals, as a form of bias indicative of prejudice.
The Court clarified that bias impairs a judge’s impartiality. It elaborated on various forms: pecuniary, personal, policy, and now, judicial obstinacy.
Allowing Mr. Justice Ajit Kumar Sengupta to preside over both the initial case and its appeal created an appearance of bias, undermining public trust. The Court reinforced the maxim “nemo debet esse judex in propria causa” (no one should be a judge in their own cause). It emphasized that justice must not only be done but also be seen to be done, ensuring the integrity of judicial proceedings.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the rule against bias is a cornerstone of natural justice and a bedrock principle of a fair legal system. By safeguarding against partiality and ensuring impartiality, it plays a vital role in upholding the fairness and legitimacy of the legal and administrative systems. It is essential for maintaining public confidence in the rule of law and ensuring that justice is both done and seen to be done, which is crucial for the proper functioning of any system that adjudicates rights and obligations.
PRESENT PROBLEM
2. The presence of relatives of commission members in the list of selected candidates, even if indirect, casts a shadow over the fairness and impartiality of the process. Given the constitutional mandate under article 14 and 16, and the principles laid down in Kraipak, Ashok Yadav and Ajay Hasia, the entire selection must be struck down as unfair, arbitrary, and constitutionally infirm.
3. The integrity of a promotion process must be beyond reproach. Involving an officer who previously evaluated the candidates’ performance violates the cardinal principle of fairness and creates an unfair disadvantage to Mr. Yadav. Based on Kraipak and related precedents, Mr. Kumar’s participation renders the selection process illegal and constitutionally infirm.